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Chuaigh Ár Lá – Debt of A Gaelsman:
Ireland’s Sovereign Debt Crisis,
National and International Responses
1

James Croke*
Abstract: How did a small island nation on the periphery of Europe go from the
pauper of the European Union, to a paragon of a market economy, and back to
fiscal ruin within the space of twenty years?
Ireland was the poorest nation in the European Economic Community (EEC) in
1988. In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s it undertook structural reforms to
fundamentally reshape its economy, the result was a booming economy
throughout the mid-to-late 1990’s and early 2000’s, primarily fueled by exports
and foreign direct investment. Rather than continue on a sustained, but slower,
growth path in the 2000’s, the Irish went on a credit binge that inflated domestic
property prices to dizzying highs and resulted in a financial hangover, the likes
of which had never been seen before in the Republic.
This credit bubble went unchecked by regulators and, in fact, was actively
encouraged by successive governments. Although asset bubbles may be
inevitable, Ireland could avoid future fiscal crises by running a more countercyclical tax policy and adopting a rules-based approach to banking regulation.
From a Europe-wide perspective, the EU should put teeth into enforcing
compliance with the fiscal spirit of Stability and Growth Pact and should create
an independent regulator to monitor systemic risk in European Union (EU)
financial institutions to ensure that kinds of problems that arose in Ireland do
not appear elsewhere in the EU.

1

Translates to “our day has passed.”
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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent global financial crisis, precipitated by the collapse of
Lehman Brothers in September of 2008, has drastically altered the short-tomedium term economic prospects of most European nations, if not all
developed economies. However, for several nations on the periphery of the
European economic landscape, the crisis has exposed startling shortcomings
in their public finances. The most severely affected of these countries are
Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain (PIIGS).2
Of the European countries in such dire fiscal straits, Ireland is perhaps
both the most surprising and the most expected example of an economy in
distress. Ireland’s situation is surprising because of the unprecedented
growth its economy experienced from the mid-nineties until 2007.3 The
Irish economy’s fall from grace was predictable for much the same reason
as the United States’ economy; it had become overheated and overly reliant
on a debt-fueled property boom.4
2

Martin de Sa’Pinto, Hedge Funds to Favor BRIC not PIIGS in 2010: Lipper, REUTERS,
Jan. 15, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/15/us-hedge-research-idUSTRE60E2
OJ20100115.
3
The Irish Economy, ECON. AND SOC. RES. INST., http://www.esri.ie/irish_economy/ (last
visited Feb. 23, 2011).
4
Jim Landers, Drowning in Debt: Ireland Faces a Tough Road to Economic Recovery,
DALL. MORNING NEWS, Sept. 26, 2010, http://www.dallasnews.com/business/headlines/
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This Comment contends that although Ireland’s economic downturn
was inevitable, its fiscal crisis was, and continues to be, greatly exacerbated
by ineffective regulation of the banking sector at the national level and poor
supervision of Ireland’s fiscal state at the European Union (EU) level.
As a relatively small economy on the edge of Europe, Ireland will
always be exposed to the economic shocks of larger nations, particularly the
United States and the United Kingdom. However, this is not to say that
Ireland cannot mitigate the effects of future external economic crises and at
least ensure that its fiscal plights are not the result of domestically created
problems. With the proper regulatory structure in place and a conservative
approach to banking regulation, Ireland can and should be able to weather
future economic storms.
This Comment first traces the development of Ireland’s economy since
its accession to the EU in Section II and the causes of the recent fiscal crisis
in Section III. The Comment will then shift its attention to the Irish
government’s response to the crisis in Section IV. Finally, in Section V, the
Comment suggests measures for the Irish government to implement to head
off future fiscal trouble and potential EU-wide coordination of banking
regulation.
A. Background and Overview of the Effect of the Financial Crisis On
Ireland
Since the beginning of the recent financial crisis, Ireland’s fiscal
situation has deteriorated dramatically. By December 2010, the national
debt soared to €93.4 billion ($129.6 billion),5 a 24% increase from 2009.6
By then end of September 2011, this figure had increased to €114.7 billion
($159.1 billion).7 Likely as a reaction to the country’s poor fiscal health,
the yield on its 10-year bonds reached a record high of 8.7% on November
10, 2010.8 This yield was 6.2 percentage points above the yield on German
Bunds.9 Although the Irish debt management agency raised €20 billion
($27.7 billion) from the bond markets prior to the yield spike and funded its
short-term obligations, the high yields made it unfeasible to finance long-

20100925-Drowning-in-Debt-Ireland-faces-3711.ece.
5
Conversions are based on exchange rate of one Euro for 1.3867 US Dollars as of
October 14, 2011 (10:52 a.m.).
6
Nat’l Treasury Mgmt Agency (Ireland), General Government Debt, http://ntma.ie/
GovernmentDebt/historicalData.php (last visited Dec. 30, 2011).
7
Nat’l Treasury Mgmt Agency (Ireland), Government Debt, http://www.ntma.ie/
GovernmentDebt/GovernmentDebt.php (last visited Dec. 30, 2011).
8
David Oakley et. al, Irish Bond Yields Surge to Record, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2010,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2a6f23d0-eca9-11df-88eb-00144feab49a.html#axzz1hgEWa5qr.
9
Editorial, Still Crazy After All These Yields, ECONOMIST, Nov. 11th, 2010,
www.economist.com/node/17465261.
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term debt.10 As of November 14, 2010, Bloomberg reported that Germany
was pressuring Ireland to avail itself of the European Financial Stability
Facility (EFSF), a newly created fund to provide for troubled European
economies, in order to quell market volatility.11 Ireland later acceded to
external pressure and accepted an emergency credit line totaling €85 billion
($111 billion) from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU.12
As a result of these developments, it is unclear how much actual
control Ireland will have in shaping its own financial regulations and
determining its own fiscal policy in the future. The terms of the EU-IMF
loan require that Ireland meet strict quarterly targets set by the EU-IMF to
reduce its budget deficit.13 Further, Ireland will have to consult the EUIMF before making any fiscal policy decisions that are “not consistent with
the agreement.”14 Because of this uncertainty in the short term, this
Comment will not focus on the immediate changes Ireland could make to
improve its public finances and short-to-medium term growth. Rather, it
will focus on long-term measures to head off future fiscal crises, like the
one Ireland is currently experiencing.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRISH ECONOMY PRECEDING THE
CRASH
Prior to joining the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973,
Ireland was among the economic underperformers of Western Europe.15
Much of Ireland’s underperformance prior to joining the EEC is attributable
to protectionist policies pursued from the early 1930’s to the 1960’s as a
means to build up domestic Irish industry in the wake of political separation
with the UK.16 Most notable of these policies was the Control of
10

Id.
Dara Doyle & Simon Kennedy, Ireland Urged to Take Aid by Officials Amid Debt
Crisis, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 12, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-12/cowensays-ireland-cooperating-with-eu-as-debt-crisis-threatens-region.html.
12
David Labanyi, Ireland to receive €85 billion bailout at 5.8% interest rate, IRISH
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2010, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2010/1128/
breaking1.htm.
13
Stephen Collins et al., Memorandum sets out detailed conditions of EU-IMF loan deal,
IRISH TIMES, Dec. 12, 2010, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/frontpage/2010/1202/
1224284574676.html.
14
Id.
15
KLAUS REGLING & MAX WATSON, A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE SOURCES OF
IRELAND’S BANKING CRISIS 21 (2010), available at http://www.bankinginquiry.gov.ie
/Preliminary%20Report%20into%20Ireland%27s%20Banking%20Crisis%2031%20May%2
02010.pdf.
16
Rory O’Donnell, Ireland’s Economic Transformation: Industrial Policy, European
Integration and Social Partnership 4, (U. Pitt. Cen. West Eur. Stud., Working Paper No. 2,
1998), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/27/ (noting that the Irish economy was deindustrialized
in the 19th century); see generally Frank Geary, Deindustrialization in Ireland to 1851:
Some Evidence from the Census, 51 ECON. HISTORY REV. 512 (1998), available at
11
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Manufactures Act,17 passed in 1933 and enforced until 1957, which
prohibited foreign ownership of Irish industry by requiring that 51% of the
voting shares of manufacturing companies be held by Irish citizens.18
These policies failed to encourage native industrial development and
resulted in recession and emigration in the 1950’s.19
Upon ascension to the EEC, Ireland was the poorest nation in the
entire EEC group of countries.20 Economic stagnation continued through
the 1980’s, a decade marked by high unemployment21 (reaching 17% in
198622), high levels of public debt (reaching 125% of GNP in 198723), and
mass emigration to the United States and the United Kingdom.24 As a
country survey by The Economist magazine in 1988 rather harshly put it:
Take a tiny, open ex-peasant economy. Place it next door to a much
larger one, from which it broke away with great bitterness barely a
lifetime ago. Infuse it with a passionate desire to enjoy the same
lifestyle as its former masters but without the same industrial
heritage or natural resources. Inevitable result: extravagance,
frustration, debt [ . . . ] Ireland is easily the poorest country in rich
north-west Europe. Its gross domestic product is a mere 64% of the
European Community average.25

This dismal trend continued until the early 1990s, when through a
series of structural and taxation reforms made in the late 1980s, the
economy underwent an unprecedented period of growth commonly referred
to as the “Celtic Tiger.”26 A heavily protectionist economy transformed
into a very open-market economy.27 Ireland’s GDP grew by an average of
http://www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-0289.00103/pdf.
17
Control of Manufactures Act 1932 (Act No. 21/1932) (Ir.), available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1932/en/act/pub/0021/index.html.
18
Antoin E. Murphy, The ‘Celtic Tiger’—An Analysis of Ireland’s Economic Growth
Performance 7-8, (Eur. U. Inst., Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Stud., Working Paper
No. 16, 2000), available at http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/00_16.pdf.
19
O’Donnell, supra note 16.
20
REGLING & WATSON, supra note 15.
21
David McKittrick, More Migrants Quitting Ireland than any EU State, INDEPENDENT
(UK), July 29, 2010, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/more-migrantsquitting-ireland-than-any-eu-state-2038004.html.
22
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND [IMF], World Economic Outlook: Sustaining the
Recovery (Oct. 1, 2009), available at www.indexmundi.com/ireland/unemployment_
rate.html.
23
Murphy, supra note 18, at 4.
24
Id.
25
Editorial, Poorest of the Rich, ECONOMIST, Jan. 16, 1988, at 3.
26
See generally Patrick Honohan & Brendan Walsh, Catching Up with the Leaders: The
Irish Hare, 2002 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1, 28 (2002).
27
See Peter Herrmann, Tíogar Ceilteach—An Enlargement Country of the 1970s as
Showcase?, 38–40 (Eur. Soc. Org. Sci. Consultancy Inst. for Indep. Res., William Thompson
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8.4% per annum between 1994 and 1999.28 Irish unemployment fell
dramatically, from 16% in 1985 to below 5% in 2001.29
Although the commentators are not in agreement as to the precise
cause or causes of this growth miracle, most agree that structural labor and
tax reforms were necessary preconditions for Ireland’s prosperity.30 Ireland
became an attractive destination for foreign direct investment due to its
English-speaking population, relatively low wages, educated workforce,
and low corporate taxes.31 Social partnership helped maintain wage
moderation in spite of a booming economy, as did an increase in the
number of women entering the workplace.32 Also contributing to growth
was a massive influx of EU money that funded, among other things,
modernization of Ireland’s physical and technological infrastructure.33
Development of infrastructure was essential in creating a framework upon
which a high-tech and export driven economy, as Ireland aspired to be,
could thrive.34
As a result of this marked growth, the standard of living in Ireland
improved, and by 2001, Irish workers’ incomes exceeded the EU average.
The wage moderation of the 1990’s had seemingly been abandoned.35 This
surge continued unabated as compensation per employee rose at two to
three times the European average rate from 1997 to 2008.36 By 2007, Irish
Working Papers 7), available at http://www.ucc.ie/en/socialpolicy/WilliamThompson
WorkingPapers/.
28
Murphy, supra note 18.
29
Honohan & Walsh, supra note 26, at 28.
30
Compare id. (arguing that Ireland’s growth miracle of the 1990s was largely the result
of catching-up with the rest of Western Europe), with Oliver Blanchard & Barry Bosworth,
Response, Comments and Discussion on Catching Up with the Leaders: The Irish Hare, 2002
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 57 (2002) (focusing on wage moderation while
increasing productivity as the proximate cause of the growth miracle).
31
See Irene Lynch Fannon, The Luck of the Irish or Just Plain Old Tax and Regulatory
Planning? The Success of Venture Capital in Ireland, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L. J. 231,
236-42 (2007).
32
Lucio Baccaro & Marco Simoni, The Irish Social Partnership and the “Celtic Tiger”
Phenomenon 5–7 (Int’l Inst. Lab. Stud., Discussion Paper No. 154, 2004), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/publications/discussion/dp15404.pdf.
33
See THE WORLD BANK, RESHAPING ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY, WORLD DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 237 (2009). Since its accession to the EU, Ireland has been a net recipient of EU
funds amounting to €62 billion ($86 billion) between 1973 and 2009. Pat Gallagher,
Balance of Payments Still in Ireland’s Favour, IRISH EXAMINER, Jul. 27, 2009,
http://archives.tcm.ie/irishexaminer/2009/07/27/story97318.asp.
34
See CEM GALIP ÖZENEN, DEP’T OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERV. (TURKEY), THE EFFECT
OF STRUCTURAL FUNDS ON IRELAND’S DEVELOPMENT AND LESSONS FOR TURKEY 19–22
(2006), available at http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/ab/ozenencg/irlanda.pdf.
35
REGLING & WATSON, supra note 15 (commenting that while the economy operated at
full employment, the focus shifted from keeping wages competitive to increasing wages to
reflect economic growth).
36
Id. at 22 (noting that prior to 1996 compensation for Irish employees grew in line with
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wages were the second highest in the EU after Luxembourg.37 Wage
inflation drastically decreased Ireland’s competitiveness and deterred
investment in exporting industries.38 Further, massive wage increases in the
public sector would later severely undermine government finances by
keeping public expenditures high in spite of a drastic fall-off in tax
revenues due to the recession.39 The problem of high wages for government
employees persists even after several rounds of cuts since 2008.40
The EU’s influence constitutes almost as important a factor as
domestic reform in shaping Ireland’s economy prior to the recent crash.
Ireland has long been a supporter of moves toward increasing European
market integration.41 It was entirely unsurprising that Ireland chose to join
the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1998 and that Ireland adopted the
Euro as its currency in 1999.42 With the introduction of the Euro, Irish
debtors and banks were able to borrow at comparatively lower interest rates
for a sustained period of time.43

other EU countries but that after 1997 Irish employees’ compensation grew faster than the
EU average and that after 2002 in particular this rate of growth increased dramatically).
37
Id.
38
Carol Newman, Lost Competitiveness Must Be Tackled, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at
5.
39
Parmy Olson, Ireland: Fiscal Situation Bad But Not IMF-Bad, FORBES, Jan. 1, 2009,
http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/15/ireland-imf-update-markets-econcx_po_0115markets06.html.
40
Ann-Marie Walsh, Public Sector Wages Fall 4% but Pay Still Beats Private Sector,
IRISH INDEPENDENT, Oct. 22, 2010, http://www.independent.ie/national-news/public-wagesdrop-4pc-but-pay-still-beats-private-sector-2390351.html.
41
This is not to say that Ireland has not had any reservations about greater European
integration, most notably the initial rejection by referendum of the Nice and Lisbon treaties.
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Rejection by Ireland Fails to Modify Nice Treaty, THE
TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Jun. 12, 2001, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1308884/
Rejection-by-Ireland-fails-to-modify-Nice-Treaty.html; Sarah Lyall and Stephen Castle,
Ireland Derails A Bid to Recast Europe’s Rules, NY TIMES, Jun. 14, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/14/world/europe/14ireland.html?pagewanted=all.
Ireland’s Constitution, unlike most EU member nations, requires a national referendum
whenever significant changes are made to existing EU treaties. Crotty v. An Taoiseach,
[1987] I.R. 713 (Ir.). Irish concerns are motivated chiefly by a fear of losing its staunch
neutrality in the international arena. See Henry McDonald, Lisbon Treaty Hangs in Balance
as Ireland Votes, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Oct. 2, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2009/oct/02/lisbon-treaty-ireland-votes-eu.
42
See Amity Stauffer, What is the European Monetary Union?,THE UNIV. OF IOWA CTR.
FOR INT’L FIN. AND DEV., http://ebook.law.uiowa.edu/ebook/faqs/what-is-the-europeanmonetary-union (last visited Nov. 10, 2011). The move to join the EMU was not solely
economic, there was (and is) a strong political desire in Ireland to reduce trade dependence
on the UK and strengthen cultural and economic ties with trading partners in continental
Europe. See Jim Power, The Debate is Good but is it Too Late?, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2000,
at 45.
43
Sebastian Dellepiane Avellaneda & Niamh Hardiman, European Economic Crisis:
Ireland in Comparative Perspective 5, (September 2, 2010) (Univ. Coll. Dublin, UCD Geary
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As a prerequisite to joining the EMU, member states must pledge to
adhere to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).44 The SGP is designed to
ensure that member states maintain budgetary discipline after the
introduction of the Euro.45 The SGP requires member countries to run
current account deficits of no more than 3% of GDP and total public debt
levels of a maximum of 60% GDP.46 In spite of its disastrous fiscal
situation, Ireland managed to stay within the bounds set by the SGP until
2008.47 Moreover, Ireland no longer controls its own monetary policy, as
this power was ceded to the European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt
when it adopted the Euro.48
Although Ireland appeared to be the picture of economic health
throughout the 2000s, all was not what it seemed. Years of budget
surpluses masked deep structural problems in the budget.49 Moreover,
expansion of bank asset sheets and record profits hid lax regulatory
oversight, poor corporate governance, and reckless lending.50 Lehman
Brothers’s collapse ostensibly precipitated the financial crisis, however
Ireland’s economic condition was actually a house of cards vulnerable to
any gust of wind.
III. CAUSES OF THE CRISIS IN IRELAND
Ireland, like almost all market economies, was deeply affected by the
near total collapse of financial systems after the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008. Even though Irish banks did not themselves

Inst. Discussion Paper Series), available at www.ucd.ie/geary/static/publications/working
papers/gearywp201046.pdf.
44
Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, 1997 O.J.
(C236).
45
See Paulo Vila Maior, The Stability and Growth Pact: Enforceable, Flexible or Dead?
2–3 (UACES 33d Annual Conference and 8th Research Conference, ‘The European Union:
The First Ten Years, the Next Ten Years?’, Univ. of Newcastle, Sept. 2003), available at
https://bdigital.ufp.pt/dspace/handle/10284/1417 (noting that the creation of the SGP was
primarily motivated by German concerns that countries joining the EMU would behave well,
fiscally speaking, in order to gain accession to the Euro but would revert back to profligate
spending once accession was secured).
46
Dellepiane & Hardiman, supra note 43, at 3.
47
Jim O’Leary, External Surveillance of Irish Fiscal Policy During the Boom, (Nat’l
Univ. of Ireland, Maynooth, Dep’t of Econ., Fin. & Accounting, Working Paper Series
N210-10, 2010), available at http://eprints.nuim.ie/1991/1/N210-10.pdf (noting that in the
five years prior to the financial crisis Ireland was running an average budget surplus of 1.3%
of GDP). In 2008 Ireland ran a deficit of €13.2 billion ($18.3 billion) or 7.3% of GDP and
fell outside the limits set by the SGP. BUDGETARY AND ECONOMIC STATISTICS, DEPT. OF
FINANCE, (2011) (IR.), available at www.finance.gov.ie/documents/guidelines/BES
Sept2011.pdf.
48
Stauffer, supra note 42.
49
REGLING & WATSON, supra note 15, at 25–26.
50
Id. at 19.
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hold toxic assets, they were heavily exposed to global money markets and
thus very vulnerable to the liquidity shocks that resulted from Lehman’s
bankruptcy.51 This exposure to the global marketplace, which was a
contributing factor to growth during the period of rapid economic
expansion in the late 1990’s and 2000’s, became an acute vulnerability
during the financial crisis. Ireland boasted a very high trade-to-GDP ratio
immediately prior to the financial crisis,52 with a particularly heavy reliance
on foreign direct investment from the United States.53 As the United States
underwent its own financial crisis,54 peripheral economies,55 such as
Ireland, suffered greatly.56 A modification of the old phrase “when the
United States sneezes the world catches a cold” is appropriate here, except
that instead of a cold, Ireland caught something akin to tuberculosis.
Although the financial crisis emanated from the United States, it would
be misguided to attribute the primary blame for the atrocious state of the
public purse in Ireland on external factors. That blame should be placed
squarely on domestic actors, both public and private.
A. Failure of State Actors
Perhaps the most glaring shortcoming of the Irish government of the
past 10 years was a failure to responsibly manage budgetary surpluses
during the period of rapid economic expansion. Throughout the 2000’s, a
series of Fianna Fáil-led57 coalitions simultaneously increased public
expenditures and cut income taxes.58 By 2009, as a result of these policies,
Ireland had among the lowest income tax burden of any Organization for
Co-operation and Development (OECD) country.59 Public expenditure

51

Id. at 16.
Herrmann, supra note 27, at 39.
53
Id. at 40.
54
I am referring specifically to the liquidity crisis that resulted from the collapse of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
55
“Peripheral economy” is a proxy for those countries on the outer edges of the European
Union (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) that have undergone national debt crises
since 2008. Editorial, The Myth of the Periphery, ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2010, at 59.
56
Gregory Connor et al., The U.S. and Irish Credit Crises: Their Distinctive Differences
and Common Features 4, (Irish Economy Note No. 10, Working Paper No. 10, 2010),
available at http://www.irisheconomy.ie/Notes/IrishEconomyNote10.pdf (noting that with
the seizure of the credit markets following Lehman’s collapse Irish banks were unable to
refinance their large foreign borrowings and that this problem was compounded by the rapid
deterioration of their domestic loan portfolios essentially bringing the entire Irish banking
system to its knees).
57
Fianna Fáil is a center-right Irish political party.
58
O’Leary, supra note 47, at 5.
59
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD], TAXING
WAGES 21 (2009).
52
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grew faster than GDP every year from 2001 until the onset of the crisis.60
In the 2007 budget alone, the government increased social welfare spending
by €973 million ($1.35 billion) and cut taxes by €501 million ($695
million).61 Not only did this combination of tax cuts and public spending
increases leave the public fiscal health very susceptible to slowdowns in
growth, but the Irish means of generating tax revenue also became more
dependent on the business cycle.62
Particularly problematic was the Irish government’s shift in tax policy
from reliable sources of taxation, like income and excise duties, to an
increased reliance on cyclical taxes, like corporate tax, stamp duties,63 and
capital gains.64 “The share of these cyclical taxes reached thirty percent of
tax revenue in 2006; in the late 1980s it had amounted to only eight
percent.”65 Although surpluses appeared to be quite large, once adjusted to
the business cycle these surpluses were in reality quite small.66 Others,
including the IMF, estimate that instead of budgetary surpluses during
2005, 2006, and 2007, Ireland actually had structural deficits of 5.4%,
5.7%, and 8.7% respectively.67
When a state’s revenue source is so heavily dependent on
transactional-type taxes, it leaves the country’s fiscal situation in a very
fragile state when fewer of the taxed transactions take place.68 Inevitably,
fewer property-related transactions did take place once credit dried up
during the liquidity crisis, and state revenue suffered accordingly.69

60

REGLING & WATSON, supra note 15, at 25–27.
Senan Hogan, Give-away Irish Budget Focuses on Families and First-time Home
Buyers, IRISH NEWS, Dec. 7, 2006, at 12. Particularly shortsighted was the government’s
decision to double the mortgage interest deduction for first-time homebuyers, thereby
perpetuating over-investment in the already inflated residential property market. Id.
62
Dellepiane & Hardiman, supra note 43, at 7–8.
63
A stamp duty applies to “any instrument that is executed in the State or, wherever
executed, relates to any property situated in the State or any matter or thing to be done in the
State . . . .” Stamp Duties Consolidation Act 1999 (Act No.31/1999) §2(1)(b) (Ir.), available
at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1999/en/act/pub/0031/index.html. This effectively means
that a tax is levied whenever property is conveyed.
64
REGLING & WATSON, supra note 15, at 26.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 25–27.
67
See INT’L MONETARY FUND [IMF], IRELAND: 2009 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION—STAFF
REPORT; AND PUBLIC INFORMATION NOTICE ON THE EXECUTIVE BOARD DISCUSSION, 21–22
(Jun. 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09195.pdf.
68
Patrick Honohan, The Irish Banking Crisis Regulatory and Financial Stability Policy
2003–2008, 29 (unpublished report to the Minister of Finance from the Governor of the
Central Bank), available at http://www.bankinginquiry.gov.ie/Background.aspx.
69
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Ireland’s financial situation was completely unsustainable, and the worry
about over-dependence on stamp duty as a means of revenue was borne out
when those sources of revenue began decline dramatically in 2007.70
B. Over-Investment in the Property Market
Ireland, like other Anglo-Saxon economies,71 has long fostered very
high levels of home ownership; 75% of all Irish homes were owneroccupied in 2007.72 It was precisely this inclination toward real estate
investment that caused the collapse of the Irish economy.73 Before 2001,
Irish economic growth was primarily driven by competitive wages and an
influx of foreign direct investment.74 After 2001, as Ireland’s wages began
to rapidly outpace GDP growth, its former competitive advantages eroded,
and unsurprisingly foreign direct investment correspondingly declined.75
During the period between 2001 and 2007, foreign direct investment in
Ireland declined dramatically from just under 15% of Eurozone FDI in 2001
to just over 5% in 2007.76
During the period when foreign direct investment was falling deeply,
the construction sector became an ever-increasing driver of growth in the
Irish economy.77 By 2007, the construction sector made up 20% of total
GDP78 and over 12% of the workforce.79 Throughout the 2000’s, Ireland
experienced an asset bubble in property much like the one that occurred in
the United States during the same time period.80 However, unlike banks in
the United States, Irish banks did not invest in exotic financial instruments
70
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or engage in complex securitization of mortgage-backed securities, rather
the problems lay in “plain vanilla property lending (especially to
commercial real estate).”81
The primary driver in inflating the Irish real estate market was the
combination of low interest rates and the availability of personal credit.82
This, in turn, was coupled with a tax deduction for mortgage interest and
incentive schemes to the construction industry.83 As a result, house-price
inflation ensued.84 Irish banks engaged in intensified lending in the real
estate sector that contributed to the bubble.85 Often, banks abandoned their
traditional conservative lending ethos in favor of increasingly risky loans.86
This can be seen in the emergence in the mid-2000’s of loans with loan-tovalue ratios87 of up to and over 95%,88 which are in stark contrast to the
average loan-to-value ratios of 60% in the mid-1990’s.89
When it became clear that the Irish economy was overheating, raising
interest rates might have been appropriate as a means to deal with the
growing asset bubble in Irish real estate.90 However, this was impossible
due to the centralization of control over monetary policy at the ECB, where
concern was directed toward larger economies in the EMU that benefitted
from low interest rates.91 Consequently, Ireland had to manage loss of
81
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exporting competitiveness through fiscal policy and wage-cost
containment.92 Due to Ireland’s unusually weak formal rules governing its
budgetary procedures,93 the Minister for Finance effectively had carte
blanche when it came to crafting a budget.94 The series of ministers in
charge of the Department of Finance, from 2001 until the crisis began,
displayed no political will to dampen the rapidly overheating property
market.95 Nothing exemplifies this more than the budgetary philosophy of
Charlie McCreevy, Minister of Finance from 1997 until 2004, in his now
infamous response when challenged on his large increases in public
expenditures—”[w]hen I have it, I’ll spend it.”96
C. Impact of the Fall
After reaching dizzying heights, property prices fell to earth with a
thud.97 In 2007, property prices nationally declined by 7.3% and by an
additional 9.1% in 2008.98 Prices fell in commuter counties of Dublin by
16.8%.99 The fall in property prices heavily impacted Irish banks, whose
domestic loan portfolios constituted as much as 61.2% of their balance
sheets.100 Shares of Anglo Irish Bank, at one time the nation’s third largest
lender, were trading at €18 ($25) per share in May 2008. Eighteen months
later, they were trading at 1% of that value.101 Unsurprisingly, Anglo Irish
Bank was very exposed to the commercial property and construction
92
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industries, with over 70% of its total loan portfolio being dedicated to those
areas.102
As a result of the violent bursting of this asset bubble, Ireland’s
economy has suffered immensely. Ireland’s GDP, which grew every year
since 1993,103 declined by 3.5% in 2008 and is expected to contract by
approximately 13.5% from 2008 through 2010.104 Any growth on the
horizon is likely to be painfully slow. GDP in 2011 is only forecasted to
increase by just over 1.0%.105 Inextricably linked to this acute contraction
of GDP has been the unemployment rate. The unemployment rate has
skyrocketed from 5.6% at the end of the second quarter of 2008 to 14.2% at
the end of the second quarter of 2011.106
To go along with these dismal economic events has been the great
human toll that the crisis has taken in Ireland. Emigration, a relic thought
to be relegated to the history books, has returned to Ireland. Thirty-five
thousand people left the country from January to April 2010 alone and a net
100,000 people are expected to leave the state by April 2012.107 For a
country of approximately 4.2 million,108 this volume of emigration has a
profound impact, both economically and emotionally. Economically, the
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loss of the young, educated workforce impacts economic recovery. 109
Emotionally, it brings up the history of Irish emigration110 that is strongly
linked with “national shame.”111 Moreover, the Irish landscape is littered
with over 2000 “ghost estates”—completed or partially completed planned
residential estates that are mostly vacant—that serve as a very visual
reminder of the country’s recent economic past.112
IV. THE IRISH RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
After the financial crisis hit in September 2008, Ireland, like most
countries, acted quickly in an effort to stem further losses in a rapidly
deteriorating situation. On October 2, 2008, the government raised deposit
protection up to €100,000 ($139,000) to shore up market confidence in Irish
banks.113 Many of the measures undertaken by the government were
adopted in haste and without the usual deliberation that attends massive
changes in public spending and banking regulation because of the extreme
stress placed on financial markets.114 It may be unfair to judge these
measures in the harsh light of day because of the conditions under which
they were made; however an assessment must be made of what the
government has done to date in order to make provisions for the future. As
the expression goes, if we do not understand history then we are doomed to
repeat it.
A. Bank Guarantees and Implementation of NAMA
In a drastic move to shore up confidence in the banking sector, the
Irish Government moved to guarantee all depositors in Irish banks in
2008.115 The assets covered by this guarantee amounted to approximately
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€365 billion ($506 billion), several times the country’s GDP.116 This
measure was designed to help ease Irish banks’ immediate short-term
liquidity concerns stemming from the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.117
In spite of the government’s explicit backing, market confidence in the
banking sector continued to deteriorate throughout 2008.118 In December
2008, as losses continued to mount, the government agreed to inject €5.5
billion ($7.6 billion) into Ireland’s three largest banks, Bank of Ireland,
Allied Irish Bank and Anglo Irish Bank.119 In return for this capital
infusion, the state took a 25% stake in Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish
Bank and a 75% controlling interest in Anglo Irish Bank.120 In January
2009, the government outlined plans to nationalize Anglo Irish Bank, a
particularly reckless commercial lender that was dubbed the “world’s worst
bank,”121 on the grounds that its failure would pose a systemic risk to the
Irish financial system.122
In an effort to clean up banks’ balance sheets and reorganize the
financial sector, the Irish government passed legislation to create the
National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) in April 2009.123 NAMA
was designed to restructure the banking sector by buying up bad debt from
six Irish financial institutions in exchange for Irish government bonds. 124
The Agency is authorized to buy property-development assets with a book
value of up to €90 billion ($124.8 billion).125
Criticism for the plan has come from many quarters, including Joseph
Stieglitz, prominent economist and Nobel Prize winner, who argues that
NAMA squanders taxpayers’ money by substantially overpaying for
essentially worthless loans.126 Underlying Stieglitz’s criticism is the
116
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difficult question of how to price these property-related assets for which
there is not a liquid market. If NAMA overpays for the assets it will be at
substantial cost to taxpayers. However, if the NAMA aggressively
negotiates down the value of these assets banks may become insolvent once
again, thereby undermining the purpose of the entire endeavor, namely, to
ensure the soundness of bank balance sheets.127 Even after NAMA had
started buying up the “bad assets” from Irish banks, losses at these
institutions have been larger than initially anticipated and the government
may have to inject yet more capital directly into these banks.128 In 2010,
Anglo Irish Bank recorded a pretax loss of €17.6 billion ($24 billion)—the
largest corporate loss in Irish history.129 Alan Dukes, a former minister for
finance and current chairman of Anglo Irish Bank, claims that total losses in
the Irish financial sector may amount to over €100 billion ($139 billion)
and require an additional €50 billion ($69.5 billion) injection of capital to
insure a stable banking core.130
B. Austerity Measures
After expending massive state resources into failing banks and with its
public finances in serious decline, it was not entirely surprising that
Standard & Poor’s downgraded Ireland’s credit rating from AAA to AA+ in
April, 2009.131 Utilizing a government stimulus as a means to jumpstart
economic growth became unfeasible with Ireland’s rising budget deficits.132
As a result, the Irish government was forced to undertake severe cuts in the
public sector wages and to institute tax increases as the sole means of
bringing public finances back in order and convincing the market that it was
serious about tackling its debt issues.133
The government announced an emergency budget in April 2009, in
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which it cut €1.8 billion ($2.5 billion) from the public budget and placed a
7% levy on pensions and an income levy on all tax brackets.134 These
measures were intensified in the year-end budget as public sector pay was
cut by 5-8% for those making less than €125,000 ($173,000) and up to 15%
for those making more than €125,000 ($173,000).135 These cuts were
unilaterally imposed on public sector workers without consultation with
public sector trade unions. Unsurprisingly, these cuts were met with harsh
criticism from trade unions that threatened widespread industrial action as a
result of the proposed cuts.136
The government, working in conjunction with trade union groups,
eventually achieved a compromise in the “Croke Park Agreement,” with the
government offering assurances that there would be no more pay cuts in
return for active implementation of public sector reform measures.137
Although an agreement was eventually reached, it is clear that the longstanding “Social Partnership”138 agreements between trade unions, business
leaders, and the Irish government had collapsed.139 In spite of industrial
strife, and in contrast to other European nations facing similar painful cuts
and tax increases, Ireland did not experience large-scale violent protests like
those seen in Greece in 2010.140
V. SUGGESTED MEASURES TO IMPROVE IRELAND’S LONGTERM FISCAL HEALTH
Ireland is in a dire fiscal condition, and there are no easy answers to
remedy its current balance sheet problems and its issues with raising capital
from the bond markets. Many of the immediate issues will likely be
addressed by an emergency loan from the EFSF, the IMF, or some
combination of the two.
Some commentators, most vocally David McWilliams, an Irish
economist and social critic, have suggested that the best approach for
Ireland to take would be to leave the EMU and return to floating its
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currency independently.141 McWilliams’ posits that if Ireland dropped the
Euro, it would be able to devalue its own currency.142 These commentators
contend that once its currency is devalued in relation to the currencies of its
main trading partners, Ireland will be able to export its way back to
economic growth.143
This is certainly a drastic measure, and whatever its purported
economic benefits, it would be very difficult to push through the political
process. Any attempt to leave the EMU would likely require a national
referendum, and thus require a majority of public support.144 However,
even after rejecting the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008,145 the Irish public still had
the second most positive view of the EU of all member states.146 Ireland’s
abandonment of the EMU would be detrimental to the country’s long-term
economic health because it would risk marginalizing the country within
Europe. Also, the debt that Ireland currently owes to external creditors is
denominated in Euros. Thus, even if Ireland were to leave the EMU and
devalue its own currency in an effort to kindle growth, the servicing of its
Euro debt would become tremendously more expensive.147
Leaving the Euro would likely harm Ireland’s long-standing
relationships with its European trading partners and weaken Ireland’s
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already shaky political standing in the EU.148 Furthermore, there is a
possibility that if Ireland leaves the Euro, other countries may follow.149
Taking this line of reasoning to its logical extreme, it is possible that the
entire Eurozone would collapse. This would wreak untold havoc on
financial markets and could have a disastrously destabilizing effect on the
global economy, potentially driving the world back into recession. This
may seem improbable, but if we have learned anything from the turmoil in
the financial markets in the past few years, it is to expect the unexpected
and plan for the worst accordingly.
Changes in banking regulation and a major overhaul in tax policy are
two areas where the Irish government can lessen the risk of future domestic
crises. This, by itself, is not enough to ensure the future economic health of
the EMU member states or the viability of the Euro itself. The EU should
create a supranational structure designed to assess systemic risk and provide
for checks when those risks arise. Moreover, integrated into this institution
should be a mechanism to provide lines of credit for fiscally distressed
member states.
A. Regulatory Reform of Banking
As pointed out above, Irish banks were at the heart and center of the
crisis in Ireland.150 It would be utterly fruitless to attempt to undertake any
other reform measures without first addressing banking regulation. At least
some of the failure of the Central Bank & Financial Services Authority of
Ireland (CBFSAI), the regulator responsible for overseeing financial
institutions in Ireland, can be attributed to its dual mandate as regulator and
promoter of the financial services industry in Ireland.151 This dual role
creates an inherent conflict of interest between ensuring that financial
institutions are fundamentally sound, and shying away from attracting
negative attention to the financial industry. A recent report commissioned
by the Minister of Finance summarizes this awkward situation by pointing
out that “[b]anks and building societies were seen as important institutions
deserving appropriate respect and threats of action by the FR [Financial
Regulator] in the absence of compliance were not typically part of the
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process.”152
A key part of this compliance problem is the system of banking
regulation that the CBFSAI operated under, namely the “principles-based”
approach. 153 The potential for reckless abuse and the risks of regulatory
capture would have been lessened had the CBFSAI been operating the less
flexible “rules-based” system. Under the principles-based system, a
regulator announces certain broad-based principles, which financial
institutions must adhere to.154 This is contrasted with a “rules-based”
system where detailed rules set out clearly what must be done and what will
happen in the event that rules are not followed.155 These systems have their
own individual merits and drawbacks. The principles-based approach gives
more flexibility to regulators about when to pursue enforcement, and it
encourages financial institutions and regulators to work to achieve a
particular result.156 The advantage under the rules-based approach is
precisely the opposite of the principles-based approach. It removes
discretion from a regulator to decide when rules have been breached and
lessens the degree to which regulators and financial institutions work
collaboratively.157 The rules-based approach is appropriate when there is a
fear that regulators will not diligently enforce stated principles.
The principles-based approach is entirely dependent on voluntary
enforcement by the regulator, which works well when that institution
creates a reputation for stringent enforcement of the stated principles.
However, when such a vigilant approach is lacking, as it was in the
CBFSAI, it signals to financial institutions that they have free reign to
proceed as they wish, irrespective of the stated principles. Part of this
laxness may be attributable to the familiarity between regulators and senior
executives at financial institutions and a desire to avoid inflicting
embarrassment on one’s acquaintances, which may be inevitable given
Ireland’s size.158
Due to the harm caused by this coziness between regulators and bank
executives, it seems that a move to a more rules-based system would be the
best approach to banking regulation in the future. If the discretion to
enforce proper banking practice and discourage risky lending is removed
152
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from the regulator’s control, those rules are more likely to be followed and
enforced. Although there are drawbacks to a rule-based system, namely,
that industries subject to the system expend substantial resources attempting
to evade the rules,159 the alternative is worse. Furthermore, the dual
mandate of the CBFSAI should be eliminated, as there is an inherent
conflict in responsibility to promote an industry and enforce regulations
upon that same industry. If there is to be a state-sponsored champion for
promotion of the Irish financial sector, this responsibility should be placed
in a totally separate development agency, such as the Irish Industrial
Development Authority or a wholly new independent agency created
specifically for this purpose. As noted above, the alternative is what Ireland
has seen in the last two years, where the close ties between the political and
business elites ensure that banks do not fear regulators and take on a
disproportionate amount of risk.
Although this comment will not go into detail as to the types of rules
Ireland should enact, there is a broad consensus that requiring banks to
maintain a high capital reserve-to-loan ratio encourages a more
conservative lending ethos.160 However, in order for such a requirement to
be truly effective, it will be necessary to coordinate an EU-wide measure to
raise capital reserves. If the measure is not EU-wide then there is a risk that
banks will relocate to other European states to take advantage of looser
capital requirements. Furthermore, having higher capital requirements in
relation to other European states may discourage increasing competition for
banking services in Ireland.
B. Readjustment of Tax Code in Favor of Counter-cyclical Revenue
Sources
One of the primary reasons Ireland’s fiscal health changed from large
surpluses to extreme deficits so quickly is that the Irish government relied
too heavily on cyclical revenue sources, stamp duties in particular.161 When
those property transactions dried up, so did tax revenue. The state needs to
shift its revenue base from a pro-business cycle approach to one that
provides a more consistent source of revenue. An annually levied property
tax would have the dual benefit of providing a dependable stream of tax
revenue and dissuading future over-investment in property. Although such
a move would undoubtedly be very unpopular with the Irish public,
desperate times call for necessary measures. The Government can use the
crisis as an opportunity to implement drastic changes. To quote Rahm
159
Honohan, supra note 68, at 47 (noting the amount of human ingenuity poured into
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160
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Emmanuel, “[n]ever allow a crisis go to waste.”162 When the economy
eventually improves, the impetus to impose such a tax will likely evaporate.
Along similar lines, the existing mortgage interest deduction should be
gradually phased out. Like the absence of a property tax, this deduction
distorts the market by providing incentives to invest in property over other
types of investment. The deduction also raises a horizontal fairness
question, namely, why should the state subsidize homeowners over
similarly situated groups like renters? Moreover, the deduction, like
deductions generally, disproportionately benefits wealthier individuals.163
C. Creation of an EU Institution Responsible for Systemic Risk
Throughout much of the sovereign debt crisis that has ravaged Europe
since 2008, the EU has been notable not for its action but for its inactive
and reactive approach.164 The Euro was set up to centralize control of
interest rates in the ECB, but the EMU left fiscal policy to the member
states.165 As a result, there was no supranational means of providing credit
to struggling member states that were in extreme fiscal distress. This
became very clear when Greece had to be bailed out in the spring of
2010.166 The EU did eventually act, however its policies on the sovereign
debt crisis were made on an ad hoc basis.167
At its inception, the SGP only provided for a small range of policy
measures to deal with member states’ fiscal deficits.168 Most of these
measures did not apply to Ireland, however. In the years immediately
preceding the crisis, Ireland’s fiscal situation fell squarely within the
constraints set by SGP. However, a probing analysis would have revealed
that public finances were on shaky economic ground. As a result, Ireland’s
dangerous financial condition continued unchecked by the EU because it
followed the letter of law—deficits within 3% of GDP169—even though it
ignored the spirit of the law by making public finances particularly
vulnerable to changes in the business cycle.170
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Even the policies that the EU could implement to ward off fiscal
irresponsibility were seldom used prior to 2008 even though member states
like France and Germany routinely ran deficits in those years.171 The
effectiveness of these “punishments” from the EU is unclear, given that
violations of the SGP are ignored by Germany and France.172 As the Irish
parliamentary committee on European affairs noted:
By late 2003 it became clear that their deficits were continuing to
rise and that neither France nor Germany would meet their targets.
Neither Member State faced sanction due to this non-compliance.
These cases pointed to obvious credibility and enforcement problems
for the SGP. If the two largest euro area economies fail to comply
with the rules then why should smaller countries do so?173

All this points to necessary changes in the enforcement of the SGP.
When the EU decided that it wanted to create a single currency for Europe,
it is clear that it did not envisage member states becoming insolvent. As a
result, it did not provide measures to prevent or deal with a worst-case
scenario, like a member state’s severe fiscal crisis requiring a bailout by the
EU. Such measures could have prevented or at least mitigated the effects of
the recent crisis.
The role of enforcing the SGP is currently held by the Economic and
Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN),174 a subgroup of the Council of the
European Union. The Council is made up of ministers of finance from the
twenty-seven member states.175 ECOFIN is the wrong entity to be
responsible for imposing sanctions for violations of the SGP due its
inherently political composition. As politicians, the ministers are unlikely
to advocate for harsh sanctions or politically unpopular changes to other
nations’ public finance. The EU should create an independent regulator
responsible for enforcing the SGP and monitoring systemic risk among
European financial institutions. This power could be rolled into the existing
functions of the ECB, much like the Federal Reserve is set to become the
regulator for systemic risk in the United States.176 The ECB possesses
experience and knowledge of international finance that make it the
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appropriate body to perform such a function.
As an ancillary function, this institution should also provide credit to
member states that are undergoing severe fiscal stress. The advantage of
having a permanent emergency credit institution is that the Eurozone will
not run into the problems that it experienced with the Greek bailout. Such
an institution could set conditions precedent to accessing credit and attach
previously agreed-upon terms to accessing states. This would provide a
more orderly and timely means to provide credit in emergency situations.
VI. CONCLUSION
If we have learned anything from the financial crisis that precipitated
the Great Recession, it is that markets and policy makers have short
memories. To counter this effect, proper institutional structures ought to be
put into place to correct for irrational exuberance of the type witnessed in
Ireland in the past decade. Ireland is an example of the disastrous
consequences that may follow if corrections are not made. Although mass
emigration may be a problem specific to Ireland, budget deficits, banking
crises, and unsustainable public debt loads are not exclusive to Ireland.
Further, the EU needs to implement changes to its structure and
enforcement of the SPG in order to provide for substantive preventive
measures to avoid fiscal disaster by member states. It also needs to provide
credit for member states in the event of budgetary crises. The current
system is too political, as it ignores the discrepancies’ of larger member
states and enforces sanctions in an uneven and unpredictable manner. It
makes much more sense for the role of surveyor of member states’ fiscal
health to be occupied by an essentially apolitical body, like the ECB.
Ireland’s recent travails present a learning opportunity for the global
economy, especially emerging markets. Since its emergence in the mid1990s, economists and policy makers have touted Ireland’s economic
model as a paragon of development and as a template for other small
developing nations. Ireland is no longer the poster-child for developing
nations; however, there is a risk of throwing the baby out with the bath
water by focusing solely on Ireland’s recent fiscal crisis. The past twenty
years of Ireland’s economic history can be broken down into two distinct
phases: the late 1980s until approximately 2001, and from 2001 or so
onward. The former phase represented real and sustained economic
development based on fundamentally sound principles, whereas the latter
stage was an attempt to continue rapid economic growth, even though most
of the gains from structural economic reform had already been realized.
The result should have been sustained, albeit slower, growth; however what
emerged was a reckless property boom and bust.
In spite of its current position, Ireland still has better economic
prospects than other debt-riddled EU countries like Greece and Portugal,
precisely because of investments in the education of its populace and the
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reforms undertaken in the first phase of the Celtic Tiger. In that sense,
Ireland’s rise and subsequent fall presents a more complete picture of
economic development and a cautionary tale to policy makers in similarly
situated nations.
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